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Possibility of Reverter
as a Taxable Entity
By HAYES R. HINDRY*
In the course of the years, from time to time, revolutionary deci-
sions have been made by the courts of our country. In the course of the
past few years, however, these decisions have been coming with increas-
ing frequency. In fact, they have been coming so fast that the practice
of law is now a hazardous occupation. A lawyer hardly dares any longer
to prognosticate in any field of the law, regardless how well settled the
point may be.
One of the most recent cases of revolutionary effect was the case of
Helvering vs. Hallock, 84 L. Ed. 382, decided in January of this year.
This case is not only revolutionary in its decision but even more so in its
implications. In order properly to understand the case,. we must revert
to three prior decisions by our United States Supreme Court. One case
is Klein vs. The United States, 283 U. S. 231, decided in 1931. The
second was Helvering vs. St. Louis Union Trust Company, 296 U. S.
39, and the third is Becker vs. St. Louis Union Trust Company, 296
U. S. 48.
In the Klein case, decedent had conveyed certain lands to his wife
by deed, the habendum clause of which was as follows:
"First. To have and to hold the said lands unto the said
grantee for and during the term of her natural life, and if she shall
die prior to the decease of said grantor then and in that event she
shall by virtue hereof take no greater or other estate in said lands
and the reversion in fee in and to the same shall in that event remain
vested in said grantor, his heirs, and assigns, such reversion being
hereby reserved to said grantor and excepted from this conveyance.
"Second. Upon condition and in the event that said grantee
shall survive the said grantor, then and in that case only the said
grantee shall by virtue of this conveyance take, have, and hold the
said lands in fee simple, unto the sole use of herself, her heirs, and
assigns forever."
On the authority of Section 302 (c) of the Internal Revenue Laws,
which is as follows:
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be deter-
mined by including the value at the time of his death of all prop-
erty, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated * * *
"(c) To the extent of any interest therein Qf which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer or with respect to which
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he has at any time created a trust * * * intended to take effect in
possession or in enjoyment at or after his death * *
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included this real estate as a part
of the gross taxable estate, after first deducting the value of the life
estate. The court, in upholding the commissioner, pointed out that this
deed covered two separate and distinct conveyances: the first, a life estate;
the second, the remainder. The court said:
"The life estate is granted with an express reservation of the
fee, which is to 'remain vested in said grantor' in the event that the
grantee 'shall die prior to the decease of said grantor.' By the second
clause the grantee takes the fee in the event-'and in that case only'
-that she shall survive the grantor. It follows that only a life
estate immediately was vested. The remainder was retained by the
grantor: and whether that ever would become vested in the grantee
depended upon the condition precedent that the death of the grantor
happen before that of the grantee. The grant of the remainder,
therefore, was contingent."
The argument had been made that because the two estates were cre-
ated by the same instrument, the lesser merged into the greater. The
court said in regard to this:
"The principle invoked, however, does not help the petition-
ers, for certainly here the estates were not merged during the life
of the grantor; and the deed evinces the clear intention of the
grantor that they should not be."
"Nothing is to be gained by multiplying words in respect of
the various niceties of the art of conveyancing or the law of contin-
gent and vested remainders. It is perfectly plain that the death of
the grantor was the indispensable and intended event which brought
the larger estate into being for the grantee and effected its transmis-
sion from the dead to the living, thus satisfying the terms of the
taxing act and justifying the tax imposed."
It will be seen that the basis of the decisioh was entirely correct and
within the basic rules and laws of conveyances. After this decision, and
in 1935, the Supreme Court rendered decisions in the St. Louis Union
Trust Company cases. In the first of these, Helvering vs. St. Louis
Union Trust Coinpany, a decedent several years prior to his death trans-
ferred certain securities in trust, the net income to be paid to decedent's
daughter during her life, with the remainder over to persons named.
The trust contained the further provision that, if the daughter prede-
ceased the father, the trust should terminate and the trust estate be trans-
ferred to the father in fee simple. The commissioner assessed the tax
against the estate upon the view that the father, having reserved the right
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to revest the trust property in him upon the happening of the contingency
mentioned, the transfer was one "intended to take effect in possession or
in enjoyment at or after his death" within the meaning of Section
302 (c). Among other things, the court, in determining that this was
not a proper part of the estate of the father, said:
"If, therefore, no interest in the property involved in a given
case pass 'from the possession, enjoyment, or control of the donor
at his death,' there is no interest with respect to which the decedent
has created a trust intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after his death. The grantor here, by the trust instrument,
left in himself no power to resume ownership, possession, or enjoy-
ment, except upon a contingency in the nature of a condition sub-
sequent, the occurrence of which was entirely fortuitous so far as
any control, design, or volition on his part was concerned. After
the execution of the trust he held no right in the trust estate which
in any sense was the subject of testamentary disposition. His death
passed no interest to any of the beneficiaries of the trust, and en-
larged none beyond what was conveyed by the indenture. His
death simply put an end to what, at best, was a mere possibility of
a reverter by extinguishing it; that is to say, by converting what
was merely possible 4nto an utter impossibility."
The court very ably distinguished the Klein case in the following
words:
"The case of Klein v. United States, 382 U. S. 231, 51 S. Ct.
398, 75 L. Ed. 996, which is strongly relied upon by the govern-
ment, does not support its position. There the grantor, 15 months
prior to his wife's death, conveyed to his wife by deed a life estate
in certain lands. But in the event that she survived the grantor,
and in that case only,' she was to take the lands in fee simple. The
effect of this deed, we held, was that only a life estate was vested,
the remainder being retained by the grantor; and whether that
should ever become vested in the grantee depended upon the condi-
tion precedent that the grantor die during the life of the grantee.
The grantor having died first, his death clearly effected a transmis-
sion of the larger estate to the grantee. But here the grantor parted
with the title and all beneficial interest in the property, retaining
no right with respect to it which would pass to any one as a result
of his death. Unlike the Klein case, where the death was the gen-
erating source of the title, here, as the court below said, the trust
instrument and not the death was the generating source. The
death did not transmit the possibility, but destroyed it." (Our
italics.)
In Becker vs. St. Louis Union Trust Company case, the decedent
executed separate declarations of trust in favor of each of his four chil-
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dren, conveying to himself certain securities. The declarations of trust
were identical in terms, and, among other things, provided:
"6 (a) If the said beneficiary should die before my death,
then this trust estate shall thereupon revert to me and become mine
immediately and absolutely, or, (b) If I should die before her
death, then this property shall thereupon become hers immediately
and absolutely, and be turned over to her, and in either case this
trust shall cease."
The commissioner had included the value of the trust as a part of
the estate, finding that the transfer was one which did not take effect in
possession or enjoyment until at or after the death of the decedent. The
District Court had found that the motive of the decedent was to decrease
his income tax by distributing a portion of his property among the four
trusts, and, at the same time, to make provision for the distribution of
his property to his children at his death. The Circuit Court of Appeals
had reached an opposite conclusion upon reviewing the evidence. They
found that the decedent was actuated by two motives: (1) To make
his children independent, and (2) to avoid high surtaxes on his income;
and that both were motives associated with life rather than death.
The Supreme Court considered, first, the question as to whether or
not the transfer of property herein involved was intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor. They
found in'this regard that under the declaration of trust, and particularly
the paragraph quoted above, the grantor did not retain any interest in
the property, but, on the contrary, made an absolute conveyance subject
only to a possibility of reverter. They further found that this mere
possibility of reverter did not in any way interfere with the completeness
of the transfer at the time of the declaration of trust. They next con-
sidered the question of whether or not this transfer was made in contem-
plation of death. In this regard they adopted the findings of the Circuit
Court of Appeals, and came to the conclusion that the two motives found
by the Circuit Court of Appeals were the motives which in fact actuated
this transfer, and that neither was associated with the idea of death.
They thus determined that the mere possibility of a reverter was not to
be considered a part or portion of the estate of the decedent.
It would seem that a rationale of these cases is very simple. The
question to be answered is simply, Did the conveyance of the decedent
during his lifetime convey the entire estate in the property, or did it
retain an interest which did not pass until the death of the decedent? In
the Klein case, the court found that the remainder was not conveyed by
the deed in question, but, on the contrary, remained by the terms of it
in the decedent until his death, and was therefore taxable. In the other
two cases, the court found that the conveyance was absolute at the time
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of the execution of the trust, and the fact that there was a mere possi-
bility of reverter under the terms of that trust did not leave any portion
of the interest in that trust to be conveyed at the time of his death. The
termination of the possibility of reverter converted what was "merely
possibility into an utter impossibility" and was therefore not taxable.
We now come to the case of Helvering vs. Hallock, which in fact
involved five separate cases with facts somewhat analogous. In three
of these cases the decedent had created a trust under separate agreement,
giving the income to his wife for life with this further provision:
"If and when Anne Lamson Hallock shall die and in such
event * * * the within trust shall terminate and said Trustee shall
* * * pay Party of the First Part if he then be living any accrued
income, then remaining in said trust fund and shall * * * deliver
forthwith to the Party of the First Part, the principal of said trust
fund. If and in the event said Party of the First Part shall not be
living, then and in such event payment and delivery over shall be
made to Levitt Hallock and Helen Hallock, respectively son and
daughter of the Party of the First Part, share and share alike * * *."
In another of the cases considered and decided by the decision, the
decedent by an antenuptial agreement conveyed property in trust, the
income to be paid to his prospective wife during her life, and subject to
the following disposition of the principal:
"In trust if the said Rae Spektor shall die during the lifetime
of said George F. Uber to pay over the principal and all accumulated
income thereof unto the said George F. Uber in fee, free and clear
of any trust.
"In trust if the said Rae Spektor after the marriage shall sur-
vive the said George F. Uber to pay over the principal and all ac-
cumulated income unto the said Rae Spektor-then Rae Uber-
in fee, free and clear of any trust."
In the last of the cases considered and decided by this one decision,
the decedent had provided for the payment of trust income to his wife
during her life and upon her death to himself if he should survive her.
The instrument contained the further provision:
"Upon the death of the survivor of said Ida Bryant and the
party of the first part, unless this trust shall have been modified or
revoked as hereinafter provided, to convey, transfer, and pay over
the principal of the trust fund to the executors or administrators
of the estate of the party hereto of the first part."
In all of these cases, the settlor predeceased the beneficiary, and in all
of the cases the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included the trusts
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as a part of the estate of the decedent, under the terms of Section 302 (c).
The taxpayers sought refuge in courts. The Supreme Court. speaking
through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, declared that the controversies arose
directly as a result of conflicting decisions, the three cases heretofore
reviewed. They then proceeded to an analysis of the three preceding
decisions. In regard to the Klein case, after stating very briefly the facts
of the case, -and that the taxpayer had contended that the decedent had
received a mere possibility of a reverter and such a remote interest extin-
guishable upon the grantor's death was not sufficient to bring the con-
veyance within the reckoning of the taxpayer's estate, Mr. Frankfurter
stated:
"This Court held otherwise. It rejected formal distinctions
pertaining to the law of real property as irrelevant criteria in this
field of taxation. 'Nothing is to be gained,' it was said, 'by multi-
plying words in respect of the various niceties of the art of convey-
ancing or the law of contingent and vested remainders.' It is per-
fectly plain that the death of the grantor was the indispensable and
intended event which brought the larger estate into being for the
grantee and effected its transmission from the dead to the living,
thus satisfying the terms of the taxing act and justifying the tax
imposed."
It is worthy of note that Mr. Frankfurter entirely ignored the true
basis of that decision (i. e., the dual character of the deed) , merely pick-
ing a euphonious phrase from the decision as a basis for it. The court
stated in regard to the two St. Louis Union Trust Company cases and
the Klein case:
"In all three situations, the result and effect were the same.
The event which gave to the beneficiaries a dominion over property
which they did not have prior to the donor's death was an act of
nature outside the grantor's 'control, design or volition.' "
The court further stated in regard to the three preceding decisions,
and in regard to the terms of the trusts in the various cases under the
immediate scrutiny of the court:
"It therefore becomes important to inquire whether the tech-
nical forms in which interests contingent upon death are cast
should control our decision. If so, it becomes necessary to deter-
mine whether the differing terms of conveyance now in issue ap-
proximate more closely those used in the Klein case and are there-
fore governed by it, or have a closer verbal resemblance to those
that saved the tax in the St. Louis Union Trust Company cases.
Such an essay in linguistic refinement would still further embarrass
existing intricacies. It might demonstrate verbal ingenuity, but it
could hardly strengthen the rational foundations of law * * *
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"Our real problem therefore is to determine whether we are
to adhere to a harmonizing principle in the construction of Section
302 (c), or whether we are to multiply gossamer disinctions be-
tween the present cases and the three earlier ones."
The court then proceeded to avery indefinite conclusion. The near-
est basis that may be drawn from this case upon which taxing principles
will be predicated henceforth in similar types of cases are contained in the
following quotation from this case:
"There are great diversities among the several states as to
the conveyancing significance of like grants; sometimes in the
same state there are conflicting lines of decision, one series ignoring
another * * *
"The importation of these distinctions and controversies from
the law of property into the administration of the estate tax pre-
cludes a fair and workable tax system. Essentially the same inter-
ests, judged from the point of view of wealth, will be taxable or
not, depending upon elusive and subtle casuistries which may have
their historic justification but possess no relevance for tax pur-
poses * *
"Distinctions which originated under a feudal economy when
land dominated social relations are peculiarly irrelevant in the ap-
plication of tax measures now so largely directed toward intangible
wealth * * *
"Freed from the distinctions introduced by the St. Louis
Union Trust Co. cases, the Klein case furnishes such a harmonizing
principle. Does, then, the doctrine of stare decisis compel us to
accept the distinctions made in the St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases
as starting points for still finer distinctions spun out of the tenuosi-
ties of surviving feudal law? We think not. We think the Klein
case rejected the presupposition of such distinctions for the fiscal
judgments which Section 302 (c) demands."
The only definite conclusions that one can draw from this case are
that a mere possibility of reverter is now a definitely taxable entity in
any decedent's estate, and that by a few "linguistic refinements" the
teachings of centuries have been swept away.
It was stated at the commencement of this analysis that during the
course of the years we come upon occasional revolutionary decisions by
our courts. A study of the decisions-of our courts in conjunction with
the history of our social and economic advancement, at least until the
early 1930's, would reveal that most of these decisions were brought
about by altered economic and industrial conditions. In other words,
the law was broadened and advanced to keep up with the economic
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world. However, in the past few years, the rapidity of these epoch-
making decisions leads one to question whether or not such is yet the
basis of these decisions. One might almost be led to believe, after a
study of these decisions and the conditions which surround them, that
the old rule that this is a government of the people, by the people, and
for the people, had been changed to a government of the people, by the
politicians, and for the politicians. The effect of this decision upon the
people of this nation might well be described, I believe, by a paraphrase
of the language of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his decision, as: "An
essay in linguistic refinement which still further embarrasses the existing
intricacies of the modern economic world. It demonstrates verbal ingen-
uity, but hardly strengthens the rational foundations of law."
NOTE: Since writing the foregoing article, a Treasury Decision
has been issued, which was later incorporated into Article 17 of Regu-
lation 70 of the Inheritance Tax Department, which states:
"* * * Where transfer was made during the period between
November 11, 1935 (that being the date upon which the Su-
preme Court of the United States rendered its decisions in the cases
of Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39, and
Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48), and January
29, 1940 (that being the date upon which such Court rendered its
decisions in Helvering v. Hallock and companion cases, 309 U. S.
106), and the Commissioner, whose determination therein shall be
conclusive, determines that such transfer is classifiable with the
transfers involved in the case of Klein v. United States, 283 U. S.
231, previously decided by such Court, then the property so trans-
ferred shall not be included in the decedent's gross estate under the
provisions of this article-, if the following condition is also met:
Such transfer shall have been finally treated for all gift tax pur-
poses, both as to the calendar year of such transfer and subsequent
calendar years. as a gift in an amount measured by the value of the
property undiminished by reason of a provision in the instrument
of transfer by which the property, in whole or in part, is to revert
to the decedent should he survive the donee or another person, or
the reverting thereof is conditioned upon some other contingency
terminable by decedent's death."
Announcement is made of the engagement of Sydney H. Grossman,
genial business manager of DICTA, to his secretary, Miss Lysbeth Fleit-
man.
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Northwestern Colorado Bar Association Organized
The members of the Ninth Judicial District Bar Association and
attorneys from the Fifth and Fourteenth Judicial Districts held a dinner
meeting at the Hotel Denver, in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, on Fri-
day, December 6, 1940, for the purpose of determining whether the
attorneys in the Fifth and Fourteenth Judicial Districts would merge
with the members of the Ninth Judicial District Bar Association, into a
consolidated bar, to be known as the, Northwestern Colorado Bar
Association.
M. J. Mayes, of Glenwood Springs, President of the Ninth Judi-
cial District Bat Association, presided and Judge Carl W. Fulghum, also
of Glenwood Springs, acted as Secretary. Judge John R. Clark, of
Glenwood Springs, discussed the advisability of consolidation, and gave
a resume of bar association organization.
Farrington R. Carpenter, of Craig, informed the meeting that the
attorneys of the Fourteenth Judicial District desired to join the associa-
tion, while Judge William H. Luby, of Eagle, stated that the attorneys
of the Fifth Judicial District had not yet decided whether to join the
proposed association or organize a separate association for themselves.
A committee consisting of Addison M. Gooding, of Steamboat
Springs, and C. H. Darrow, of Glenwood Springs, was appointed to
draft amendments of the by-laws of the Ninth Judicial District Bar
Association so as to include attorneys of the Fourteenth District, with
proviso that the attorneys of the Fifth District should have the right to
join upon future notice. The committee reported and the meeting
adopted the amendments.
The meeting decided to continue holding Legal Institutes to be
sponsored by the Northwestern Colorado Bar Association. The impor-
tance of the institutes and the value received from them were stressed.
A committee consisting of William A. Mason, of Rifle, Allyn Cole
and C. H. Darrow, both of Glenwood Springs, was named to study and
make report concerning the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1940,
and the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Colorado concerning the
same subject.
-. C. H. DARROW, Correspondent.
ALBERT J. GOULD Points Out Some
Current Tax Problems
Transactions Between Stockholder and His
Wholly Owned Corporation
The effect of transactions between a stockholder and a wholly
owned corporation has been the subject of much uncertainty. The fol-
lowing quotation from Wilhelmina Doth v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A.
178, 11-14-40, seems to establish the rule that such transactions are
recognized if the transaction "is carried out in the way that the ordinary
parties to a business transaction would deal with each other" and are
not recognized "when actual market prices play no part" in the tralsac-
tion.
"The courts have held that a loss is deductible upon a bona fide
sale by an individual to a wholly owned corporation. Jones v. Heluer-
ing, 71 Fed. (2d) 214; Commissioner v. Eldridge, 79 Fed. (2d) 629.
Where there is a bona fide sale it may be made without a cash payment
at the time and it may create an indebtedness. The mere fact that the
purpose of the transaction may be to minimize taxes does not make the
transaction ineffective if it is in all other respects a bona fide transaction.
But if there is no real transfer of title, no complete relinquishment of
dominion and control to the purchaser by the seller, the transaction is
not effective to constitute a bona fide sale the consequences of which may
be given effect for purposes of tax benefits by way of providing a basis
for a deduction. Wickwire v. United States, 27 Fed. Supp. 724; Pierre
S. du Pont, 37 B. T. A. 1198; Shoenberg v. Commissioner, supra;
Higgins v. Smith, supra. The test to determine whether a transaction
is a bona fide transaction is described by the term "arm's length," or, in
other words, Was the transaction carried out in the way that the ordi-
nary parties to a business transaction would deal with each other?
"When actual market prices play no part in a sale of stocks a ques-
tion at once arises whether the transaction is bona fide. It is not reason-
able that a seller is willing to sell property at less than its worth, or that
a buyer is willing to buy for more than the reasonable worth of property.
Where the facts show that the parties to a sale demonstrate such a lack of
interest as to the price at which one sells to another that the buyer pur-
portedly gives a sum greatly in excess of the worth of the property, such
facts indicate that what was done was not a real business transaction and
'was not intended to have the usual results and significance of a bona
fide business deal.' Pierre S. du Pont, supra, p. 1242. Here petitioners,
16
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the sole stockholders of Unidauth, could establish an apparent loss to
Unidauth by offering to sell and selling the stocks in question at cost to
them at a time when Unidauth, selling the stocks on the market, would
realize a loss. The effect was to give to their wholly owned corporation
the benefit of a loss which, otherwise, they would be entitled to realize.
It mattered not to petitioners, because they expected to receive reimburse-
ment of the full cost of the securities to them from Unidauth from its
earnings.
"Under such circumstances it must be held that the purported sale
in 1929 was not a bona fide sale effective to create a valid debt from
Unidauth in the amount of the agreed purchase price and effective later,
in the taxable year, to support petitioner's claims that they sustained
losses from their transactions with and investments iln Unidauth."
Contributions to Corporations
In Scanlan v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A. 146, 10-18-40, the Board
of Tax Appeals held that a voluntary contribution by a taxpayer to a
corporation of which he is the sole stockholder was not subject to the
gift tax statute, and distinguished Frank B. Thompson, 42 B. T. A.
No. 121, wherein it was held that a stockholder who makes a contribu-
tion to the capital of a corporation is subject to the gift tax, if there are
other stockholders in the corporation, because they benefit proportion-
ately from the receipt of the property by the corporation.
The above mentioned decisions are pertinent in connection with
the question in mining states as to whether the donation to the corpora-
tion of 49% of the stock by the promoters is subject to gift tax. These
decisions would seem to establish the rule that if all stockholders donate
amounts proportionate to their respective holdings in the company, no
stockholder has benefited by the act of any other and the transaction is
not subject to gift tax.
Those who have attended the law institutes throughout the state
will recall our discussion of this problem.
The El Paso County Bar Association, on November 19th, selected
Roy A. Foard as president of the association to succeed Judge Willard T.
Simmons, who passed away in October. G. Russell Miller was selected
as vice-president to succeed Roy A. Foard.
In the absence of the new president, due to illness, Clyde H. Bab-
cock, secretary of the association, presided. Thomas Burgess, a member
of the local bar, made a brief survey of the wage and hour law, which
proved of great interest to the locaq bar.
-- Charles J. Simon, Correspondent.
Current Events of
Bench and Bar
By FRED E. NEEF
Difficult Period Ahead for Lawyers
In a current issue of the Commercial Law Journal, Herbert V.
Feibelman of the Miami Bar predicts a dark future for the legal profes-
sion. If Hitler wins the war, he sees the American Bar grovelling on the
hillsides, planting and digging potatoes, perhaps begging for clothes.
His advice to young persons desirous of studying law is to learn to do
something useful for the army or navy, and after the war be prepared
for whatever type of service America may need, for America may then
need farmers and cowpunchers more than she does lawyers.
Stringent Examinations for Notaries
In an effort to protect the public against unqualified and unscrupu-
lous notaries, judges of Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court of Ohio
hereafter will require all applicants for notary public commissions to
state under oath the facts about their education, experience and personal
records.
Applicants must also undergo an examination by members of a
joint committee of 30 lawyers to be named by the Cleveland and the
Cuyahoga County Bar Associations.
Deferment for Lawyers
Induction into military service of young lawyers will be deferred in
two situations, according to instructions issued by Selective Service Di-
rector Clarence A. Dykstra to local draft boards throughout the country.
First, when their removal would disrupt a vital community service,
as when the young lawyer in question is the only attorney in a small
community.
Second, when extraordinary individual hardship would result from
the induction of the young lawyer into the army.
In the first case, Dykstra recommends that military service be de-
ferred until some arrangement can be made for professional services in
the community, and in the second a temporary deferment giving the
drafted lawyer sufficient time in which to arrange his affairs.
More Young Lawyers Needed as G-Men
There is still a big demand for qualified young lawyers as special
agents for the FBI. The department is offering an entrance salary of
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$3,200 per year. These jobs are not temporary, and the young lawyer
has the assurance of a lifetime career with prospects of advancement to
$3,800 a year and higher.
Briefing Service for Lawyers
The State Bar Association of New Jersey plans the establishment of
a briefing service for the lawyers and courts of New Jersey. Service will
be rendered to:
1. Lawyers who are in need of it either because they have not the
time to do the work themselves and cannot afford full-time assistants
or because large libraries are not easily accessible.
2. The courts, in which case the association would appear as
amicus curiae.
3. Legal aid societies..
Compensation will be paid by members of the first group on an
hourly basis.
Dues Remitted for Lawyers in Draft
The Pennsylvania Bar Association has adopted the following reso-
lution:
RESOLVED, that members of this association inducted into active
military service of the United States shall be relieved from the payment
of dues to this association during such period of active military service
and six months thereafter.
Blood Test Cannot Be Used to Prove Adultery
In the New Jersey case of Bednarik vs. Bednarik it was held that a
blood test of the husband and the child showing a lack of paternity was
not admissible in a divorce action to prove adultery on the part of the
mother. The court limits the use of blood tests to paternity proceedings.
Sorrie More Administrative Absolutism!
The latest effort on the part of the administrative agencies to restrict
the attorneys from appearing before such tribunals appears in Rule 369
of the Selective Service Regulations under the Selective Service and
Training Act of 1940. This rule provides that a registrant may appear
in person before the local draft board for the purpose of presenting his
arguments and introducing evidence in support of his claim for reclassi-
fication. At that hearing the evidence "must be in writing in the form
of documents, affidavits, or depositions and shall be included in and made
a part of his file." The rule theft continues: "No registrant may be
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represented before the local board by an attorney." And yet governmen-
tal officials throughout the nation have called upon the bar to lend every
support to the Selective Service Draft and lawyers have responded by
volunteering their services in every county in the nation!
Pueblo Bar Elects Officers
0. G. Pope, who has served as secretary-treasurer of the Pueblo
County Bar Association since 1924, was named president of the organ-
ization at a meeting held in the District Court chambers of Judge Harry
Leddy. Pope succeeds District Attorney Ralph L. Neary.
Pope was unanimously elected to the office after he had been nomi-
nated by Judge Leddy. Charles F. Keen was named vice-president.
John Marsalis was elected secretary-treasurer after he warned the associ-
ation that he would serve in the office only one year.
At a memorial service at which Judges Leddy, J. Arthur Phelps
and Hubert Glover sat en banc, the late Congressman John A. Martin,
a long-time member of the bar, was eulogized in a resolution read by
Harry Vories. Congressman Martin died in Washington a year ago.
Impromptu talks commemorating Mr. Martin were given by John
B. Barnard, who for many years was his law associate, Sperry S. Packard
and Judge Leddy.
Members of the memorial committee were J. W. Preston, chairman,
Riley Cloud, L. E. Langdon, Benjamin F. Koperlik and Matt Kochevar.
-HARRY S. PETERSEN, Correspondent.
Henry Tupper
Henry Tupper, one of the older members of the Mesa County
bar, died at his home in Grand Junction on November 25, 1940.
Mr. Tupper was born at Kaneville, Illinois, on June 22, 1875, and
graduated from the University of Michigan in 1899. After teaching
school for several years, he atterded and obtained a law degree from the
Illinois College of Law. He was admitted to the Illinois bar in 1907
and then moved to Colorado, where he was admitted to the bar in 1909.
Upon first coming to Colorado he was associated with James W. Bucklin
in the practice of law and. at the time of his death, he was senior member
of the firm of Tupper, Smith & Holmes.
Mr. Tupper was City Attorney for the city of Grand Junction
from 1911 to 1921 and during these years was instrumental in the for-
mation and perfection of the charter form of government.
He is survived by his widow, Clara Mills Tupper, three sons, Dr.
Harvey M. Tupper, Henry J. Tupper, and Thomas Tupper, and a
daughter, Mrs: Clara Price.
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Mesa County Bar Proposes Statute for County
Law Libraries
Inasmuch as some question has arisen as to the authority of the
county commissioners to establish law libraries in each county, the
Mesa County Bar Association is sponsoring an act which will give the
county commissioners authority to establish such county libraries.
About a year ago a great many of the Mesa County Bar Associa-
tion attorneys voluntarily agreed to donate all fees obtained from
services as guardian ad litem and counsel for indigent cases toward the
establishment of a county law library. While the revenue obtained
from these sources is not sufficient to start a law library, it will go a
long way toward maintaining one; and the Mesa County Commis-
sioners have indicated a willingness to establish such a library if they
have authority to do so.
In order to eliminate any question as to the authority of the
counties to establish law libraries, the Mesa County Bar Association
has drafted and is sponsoring the following act which is permissive
in authority.
"AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION 9 OF CHAPTER 45, VOLUME II,
COLORADO STATUTES ANNOTATED, 1935, AND PROVIDING FOR
ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF COUNTY LAW LI-
BRARIES.
Be It Enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:
Sec. 1. That Sec. 9 of Chapter 45, Volume II of Colorado
Statutes Annotated, 1935, be and the same is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Sec. 9. Levy for County Buildings, Roads, etc.-Any county
may levy such rate as it may see fit for the erection, maintaining, re-
pairing, leasing or renting of county buildings, roads and bridges, bonds
and interest thereon, or judgment bonds and interest thereon, for school
purposes, and for the purchase of books, furniture and equipment for
the establishment of a County Law Library for the use of the Courts
of the County, and for the maintenance of such library."
-- John C. Banks, Correspondent.
Mesa County Bar Meets
Eugene S. Mast was elected President, and John C. Banks was
elected Secretary of the Mesa County Bar Association at a dinner meet-
ing held in the La Court Hotel in Grand Junction on December 14, 1940.
Mr. Justice Norris C. Bakke was the guest of honor and gave a
very interesting talk upon the life of Sam Houston, based upon the
book entitled "The Raven" and supplemented by information he
obtained on a visit to points of interest in Texas.
The Association also held a meeting on November 29, 1940,
which was devoted to matters of local business.
-John C. Banks, Correspondent.
Supreme Court Decisions
No. 14864. State of Colorado, et al. ts. Wilson, et al. Decided No-
vember 1, 1940.
1. Held that the constitutional amendment (Art. XXIV) applied
to state taxes, and not to municipal taxes and hence the Old Age Pension
Fund had no claim upon the Denver tax on cigarettes.
2. Intervenor's claim was no part of the controversy here and is
not answered. Opinion by Justice Bouck.
No. 14774. Peiffer vs. People. Decided November 4, 1940.
1. Where the defendant was charged with operating a confidence
game and obtaining property under false pretenses, a note signed by the
defendant under the circumstances of the case held a "bogus instrument
well calculated to impose upon the unskilled and unwary" within the
meaning of Sec. 222, Ch. 48, C. S. A.
2. Evidence found ample to support the charge of false pre-
tenses.
3. Similar transactions are admissible to prove intent.
4. Failure to give the instruction that any person may transact
business under a trade name of his own choosing held not prejudicial
error here. Opinion by Justice Burke.
No. 14654. Stone vs. Union Fire Insurance Company. Decided No-
vember 4, 1940.
1. While the American Bar Association advocates admission of
statements otherwise violative of hearsay rule where the death of declar-
ant has subsequently occurred and where the declarations were made
before the controversy had arisen, no such exception to the hearsay rule
has been sanctioned by legislative action or judicial pronouncement in
this state.
2. Admission of testimony of assistant fire chief that in his opin-
ion fire was caused by highly inflammable liquids, held error because the
business in this case was in no way connected with the plaintiff.
3. No greater degree of proof than by the preponderance of the
evidence is necessary with regard to the defense of willful burning.
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4. Refusal of the court to instruct the jury to disregard defense
of lack of notice of a chattel mortgage was held not error, as this is a
question of fact by the jury.
5. Admission of testimony and witness from the assessor's office
.to show tax schedule where the plaintiff had fixed the value of the prop-
erty held not error. If it had been offered to show the value the assessor
had put on the property, it would have been error. Opinion by Justice
Bock.
No. 14857. Vasquez vs. Morrow, et al. Decided November 4, 1940.
1. In a personal injuries case where the trial court made findings
of fact and gave judgment to the defendant on the grounds that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, the case was reversed and remanded
in that the evidence did not support the finding of fact. The finding of
fact by the trial court is not conclusive where there is insufficient evidence
to sustain such findings.
2. Where two automobiles are traveling in the same direction, the
one in front has the superior right and may maintain this. position if
there is sufficient space on its left to enable approaching car to pass safely.
3. Motorist passing is bound to ascertain if the situation is one
in which an ordinary prudent person would think it safe to pass. Opin-
ion by Justice Knous.
No. 14547. Dikeou &3 Dikeou, Copartners Doing Business as Dikeou
Bros. us. Food Distributors Association. Decided November 12,
1940.
Question whether defendants sold cigarettes below cost with intent
to injure competitor under Unfair Practice Act (Ch. 261, S. L. 1937),
held: 1. A nonprofit corporation is a proper party to institute proceed-
ings under the act.
2. Evidence found sufficient to establish that cost, plus cost of
doing business, was above the selling price here.
3. Cost need not be absolutely exact but good faith is necessary,
and the evidence here warrants a finding of lack of good faith.
4. The question of permitting the filing of amended pleadings is
within the trial court's discretion.
5. Unfair Practice Act is not a price fixing law. The court men-
tioned the fact that though the constitutionality of the act was not in
issue here, four states had held a similar act unconstitutional. Opinion
by Justice Bock. Burke dissents.
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No. 14679. Fishel vs. City and County of Denver. Decided November
12, 1940.
In a proceeding to acquire land for bombing field for the air school
the question was whether in the instant proceedings the city was author-
ized to exercise the power of eminent domain.
HELD: 1. Since the question was raised on demurrer and plead-
ings stated that the land was to be* used in cooperation with the federal
government and that the field would be of local use and benefit of the
city and its people, a demurrer contending that eminent domain could not
be exercised since the field was for exclusive governmental purpose was
properly overruled.
2. Bombing field for the air school held a municipal purpose un-
der the authority of 101 Colo. 3 16.
3. Under Constitution Art. XX it was intended to give as much
home rule in local municipal affairs as could be granted under a republi-
can form of government and the enumeration of powers there is not
exclusive, but merely a simple expression of a few of the more promi-
nent powers which municipal corporations are frequently granted.
4. Such a municipality can under such power condemn land out-
side municipal limits.
5. Where there is nothing in the record from which it can be
definitely ascertained that the jury did not take into consideration the
question of interest in fixing the amount of the verdict even if instruction
in regard to interest were given by the court, the court cannot after verdict
add interest to sum found by the jury.
6. The statute providing for payment of taxes by the vendor
where the transfer is made after July 30th applies to voluntary convey-
ances and not to condemnation proceedings. Opinion by Justice Knous.
No. 14872. Schmoyer us. City and County of Denver, et al. Decided
November 12, 1940. Affirmed without opinion.
No. 14729. George Rush vs. The Lung Sanitarium, et al. Decided
November 12, 1940.
Where an action is brought before a justice of the peace in one
county and is transferred to a justice of the peace in another county, the
latter held not to have jurisdiction to try the case. Opinion by Justice
Hilliard.
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No. 14785. Alson Investment Co. and The National Casualty Com-
pany vs. Youngquist, et al. Decided November 18, 1940.
In a workmen's compensation case where A was the owner of
property and where R managed the property, collected the rent and made
improvements and repairs and received 10% plus on repairs, and where
claimant was hired-by R and did not know A, held owner (A) was not
subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act under Sec. 329, Ch. 97,
C. S. A. Opinion by Justice Burke.
No. 14488. de Bit us. Howard. Decided November 18, 1940.
In an action to foreclose an attorney's lien, where there was a sub-
sequent compromise between the parties and such compromise provided
for periodical payments and living expenses of the plaintiff, held: lien
attaches to the amount which the defendant was obligated to pay the
plaintiff and that the defendant is in no way prejudiced because the
defendant may credit the amount paid to the attorney against that which
he would otherwise pay to the plaintiff. Opinion by Justice Bakke.
No. 14750. Polly vs. People. Decided November 25, 1940.
1. Statements made by decedent on plea of the physician that the
decedent would have no chance of recovery unless she confided in him,
held not to satisfy requisites of a dying declaration, for the decedent must
be conscious of impending death and the declaration must be voluntarily
made to constitute a dying declaration.
2. "Any object" held not an "instrument" within the abortion
statute.
3. Instruction that "when a physiciin inserts into the womb of a
pregnant woman an instrument calculated to produce irritation and
derangement of female economy, and abortion follows, the intention to
produce the result is a necessary conclusion of the act" held error.
Opinion by Justice Bock.
No. 14809. Industrial Commission, et al. vs. Strome. Decided No-
vember 25, 1940.
Willful assault by.a fellow employee held not arising out of em-
ployment.
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No. 14742. Rice vs. Marlar. Decided December 2, 1940.
1. Taxicab company held liable for wilful assault upon the
plaintiff by the employee of the cab company while the plaintiff was
a passenger in such cab and the employee was within the scope of his
employment in driving the cab.
2. Motion for non-suit admits the truth of the plaintiff's evi-
dence and eveiy inference of fact that can legitimately be drawn there-
from and the evidence must be interpreted most strongly against the
defendant. Opinion by Justice Bock.
No. 14706. Medberry vs. People. Decided December 2, 1940.
Assuming but not deciding that the common law writ of coram
nobis is applicable in Colorado, held that in this case such a writ would
not lie. The writ in jurisdictions where it applies will not be granted
in criminal cases after trial and conviction except where it clearly appears
that the petitioner had a valid defense in the facts of the case but which
without negligence'on his part was not made because of -duress, fraud,
or excusable mistake. The contention here was that defendant's former
counsel refused to permit defendant to show indecent proposals which
lead to a fight in which the defendant contended the decedent was killed
as a result of accidental shooting. Held that an affidavit of defendant
unassailed by counter affidavits did not establish the truth thereof; that
accidental shooting had been pressed in the original trial; whether one
or another cause preceded the shooting was immaterial, and indecent
proposals was not a new defense. Trial court affirmed. Opinion by
Justice Bock.
No. 14682. Cox us. Godec. Decided December 9, 1940.
1. In an F. E. D. suit where the title is placed in issue in a justice
court the cause must be certified to the District Court as set out in Sec.
12, Ch. 96 C. S. A. and if there is any contrary language in Wise v.
Schummel, 76 Colo. 184 to the effect that only under subdivisions
6, 7, 8, and 9, of Sec. 4, Ch. 70 C. S. A. is certification to the District
Court required, it must to that extent be modified.
2. Where there is a permissive entry upon land, it is only when
it is shown by satisfactory evidence that such possession of the entrant
became antagonistic and hostile, with notice to the owner and such
possession continues for the period required by law, that adverse posses-
sion can prevail. Opinion by Justice Bock.
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No. 14631. Rocky Mountain Beverage Co. vs. Walker Beverage Co.
Decided December 9, 1940.
1. In -an action on a book account, a ledger into which sales
slips were posted is a book of original entry and admissible in evidence
under Sec. 3, Ch. 177 C. S. A.
2. It was not error for the court to dismiss defendant's cross-
complaint without prejudice on defendant's motion. Opinion by
Justice Bakke. Bock, Justice, dissents.
No. 14859. Emerson vs. Guthner, Mgr. of Safety, et al. Decided
December 16, 1940.
In a habeas corpus proceeding where it was alleged that the peti-
tioner was not in the state at the time of the issuance of the writ, the
court should not have dismissed the writ but should have inquired into
the ability of the respondent to produce the petitioner. Opinion by
Justice Knous.
No. 14340. National Surety Corp. vs. Hall. Decided December 6,
1940.
1. In an action on a bond evidence reviewed and found that
employee was in the scope of his employment at the time of the theft
against which the bond was conditioned.
2. Recovery on the borrd of one does not prevent recovery on a
bond of another for the same default. Opinion by Justice Bakke.
No. 14885. Gates vs. Central City Opera House Assn., et al. De-
cided December 23, 1940.
Where an artist while performing services for the defendant froze
his fingers the injury resulted from an accident within the meaning of
the workmen's compensation act. Opinion by Justice Bock.
No.14641. Cowles vs. People. Decided December 23, 1940.
1. Evidence reviewed and found sufficient to justify conviction
of procuring an abortion.
2. It is not necessary that all witnesses for the same side concur
in the details. It is the province of the jury to determine their credibility.
3. Where the statement of the decedent was shown to and
assented to by the defendant upon his arrest it became admissible in
evidence against the defendant. Opinion by Justice Burke.
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No. 14796. Weidensaul'vs. Industrial Commission, et al. Decided
December 9, 1940.
In a workmen's compensation case where claimant did not file
claim until after six months from time of accident held that the assur-
ance by the claimant's doctor to the claimant that everything would be
taken care of did not constitute an estoppel of the right to raise the
statute of limitations.
2. Evidence reviewed and found sufficient to justify the finding
that the claimant was mentally competent to have filed a claim before
the expiration of the six months period.
No. 14883. Warner Construction Company, et al. vs. Watkins, et al.
Decided December 23, 1940.
Where the decedent employee of a construction company stopped
at his home for dinner and was injured at that time, the injury arose out
of and in the course of his employment so as to entitle him to com-
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"A mechanic cannot work without tools and the better the tools,
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